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Abstract. In a vendor managed inventory (VMI) system, the effects of financial incentives 
on the entire supply chain (SC) and on the individual firms are investigated in this study. 
To this end, order management, order replenishment and inventory control activities of a 
two-echelon SC are examined via modeling using discrete event simulation. By determin-
ing the appropriate parameters for the incentives with scenario analysis, balanced profit 
distribution between buyers and a supplier in VMI is established. Simulation outputs of 
the traditional model, VMI only and VMI with incentives models are compared based on 
profits with paired comparisons. In VMI with incentives, both buyers, and the supplier 
experience higher benefits than the traditional system. This study provides a new method 
which eliminates the unbalanced benefit distribution due to VMI and offers almost equal 
benefits to the participating firms. With financial incentives, firms are encouraged to share 
information with each other to work in a coordinated SC.
Keywords: vendor managed inventory, supply chain contracts, distribution network, 
simulation, modeling, inventory management, incentive systems, performance.
JEL Classification: M11, C15.
Introduction
In contemporary global markets, geographically distant firms still have dependencies to 
each other. Traditional supply chains (SC) where each firm acts independently may not 
be beneficial in a setting with distant partners. Vendor managed inventory (VMI) is used 
as an alternative to the traditional SC system by coordinating firms based on inventory 
management (Davis-Sramek et al. 2009). In a VMI setting, a buyer shares its demand 
and inventory information with its supplier, and the supplier uses this information to 
decide when and how much product to be sent to the buyer (Al-Ameri et al. 2008; Ryu 
2006; Southard, Swenseth 2008; Tanskanen et al. 2009). Previous studies show that the 
VMI system has a positive influence on the SC network performance. When the firm 
based performance in the SC is considered, previous findings indicate that at least one 
164
S. Bi̇ri̇m, C. Sofyalioglu. Evaluating vendor managed inventory systems: how incentives can benefit ...
of the participating firms may not get benefit from VMI (Mishra, Raghunathan 2004; 
Yao et al. 2007; Yu et al. 2009). The aim of the coordination mechanisms should not 
be only to make all the system profitable but also to provide financial benefits for every 
participating firm. Firms may not be willing to be part of this system if they do not 
benefit individually (Simatupang, Sridharan 2002). These participating firms could be 
encouraged by using financial incentives. To the best of our knowledge, using financial 
incentives to improve VMI benefits for individual firms is missing in the VMI literature. 
This study embeds an incentive system in a VMI SC that includes multiple buyers and 
a supplier. The proposed incentive system is compared with traditional system and the 
VMI only system. Based on the comparisons, this study discusses the effects of VMI 
and the incentive system on the SC and the individual firms separately. The proposed 
SC networks are modeled by discrete event simulation. Parameters of the incentive 
system used in the simulation runs are selected by a scenario analysis. The goal of the 
scenario analysis is to make sure that all the participants will benefit and have almost 
equal profits. The main aim of this study is to construct a VMI system with incentives 
that produce more profits for the whole SC and the participating firms comparing to a 
traditional system with assuring balanced benefit distribution for the participating firms. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 1 presents literature review. Section 2 
describes the methodology of the study. Section 3 shows the application of the method-
ologies with a numerical example. Section 4 demonstrates the results of the numerical 
example. Finally, in the conclusions section, findings are discussed. 
1. Literature review
Vendor managed inventory and supply chain contracts have been extensively studied 
in the literature for the last decades. Govindan (2013) identified six VMI dimensions: 
inventory, transportation, manufacturing, coordination, general benefits and information 
sharing. Govindan et al. (2013) categorized coordination contracts based on transfer 
payments, inventory risk allocation, and advance-purchase discount. For a detailed lit-
erature review for VMI and SC contracts, studies of Govindan (2013) and Govindan 
et al. (2013) can be referred respectively. 
1.1. Vendor managed inventory
In a VMI system, the buyer does not give an order; instead, the supplier decides when 
and how much to send to the buyer. For this system to work properly, the buyer needs 
to share demand and the inventory information. 
In this study, effects of VMI are considered in two aspects; the whole SC network and 
the participating firms. Several studies indicate that benefits of VMI on SC include de-
creased inventory amounts, costs, stock out problems and increased service levels. In 
a recent study, Choudhary and Shankar (2015) showed that in many cases VMI brings 
less cost and less inventory than the traditional system under time-varying stochastic 
demand. 
Mateen and Chatterjee (2016) demonstrated that VMI does not only decreased costs 
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but also reduced Greenhouse Gas Emissions. De Toni and Zamolo (2005) indicated in 
their study that VMI decreased the total inventory amount in the electrical appliances 
chain. Bertazzi et al. (2005) showed that VMI decreased the average costs compared 
to the traditional system. Sari (2007) also found that VMI decreased inventory levels 
and costs in the SC. Gronalt and Rauch (2008) demonstrated that VMI decreased the 
average raw material inventory in the system and increased service levels. Southard 
and Swenseth (2008) indicated that VMI decreased distribution costs in an agricultural 
simulation study. Disney and Towill (2003) found that VMI decreased bullwhip effect 
as opposed to the traditional system.
Niknamfar (2015) used VMI to integrate production-distribution planning while man-
aging bullwhip effect and concluded that VMI revealed more efficient SC than the 
traditional system. Govindan (2015) compared VMI and the traditional system under 
stochastic demand with low and high variability. Their VMI system under Silver–Meal 
heuristic with safety stock revealed the least SC cost.
How VMI offers firm-based benefits is also a matter of interest in the literature. Choud-
hary and Shankar (2015) showed that in most of the cases, buyers’ inventory levels and 
suppliers’ inventory levels decreased due to VMI. 
Dong and Xu (2002) indicated in their studies that, in the short term the buyer had an 
increased profit from VMI, but the supplier’s profit decreased. Supplier only experi-
enced benefits from VMI in the long run at certain inventory cost values. Mishra and 
Raghunathan (2004) found that the supplier’s inventory was much more in VMI than 
in the traditional system and retailers had increased profits. Yao et al. (2007) showed 
that VMI increased the inventory of the supplier. In Yu et al. (2009) study, the buyer’s 
inventory costs decreased, and the supplier’s inventory costs increased in the short term. 
In the long term, all the members benefit from VMI. 
Chakraborty et al. (2015) proposed a setting with VMI in which vendor pays a penalty 
cost when the buyer’s stock exceeds a predetermined limit. The authors investigated an 
appropriate stock limit and penalty cost levels in which both buyer and the vendor are 
better off. This study is similar to ours in finding appropriate parameters in which both 
parties benefit. Different from our study, Chakraborty et al. (2015) used penalty cost 
based on stock limits while cost and incentive parameters are based on backorders and 
lead time in our study. 
As a summary, Table 1 presents which participating partner benefits from VMI as in-
dicated in the previous research. Studies in the past literature mostly indicate that one 
party benefits from VMI system and this benefiting party is usually the buyer. Only one 
study using cost-sharing mechanisms showed that both buyers and the supplier benefited 
from VMI (Chakraborty et al. 2015) but did not state which part benefited more. What 
is missing in the literature is the proposition of a method that eliminates the unbalanced 
benefit distribution due to VMI by providing almost equal benefits to the participating 
firms. To fill this gap in the literature, this study explores how benefits from VMI can 
be distributed evenly among partners while identifying the most appropriate incentive 
parameters. 
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1.2. Incentive systems in the SC
Incentive contracts in SCs are mostly used to distribute risks and benefits due to co-
ordination of the chain members (Giannoccaro, Pontrandolfo 2004). The most popular 
incentives in the literature are wholesale contracts (Gerchak, Wang 2004; Wang et al. 
2013), buy-back (Ding, Chen 2008), revenue sharing (Gerchak, Wang 2004; Giannoc-
caro, Pontrandolfo 2004; Palsule-Desai 2013; Zhou, Yang 2008), quantity flexibility 
(Tsay 1999), sales rebate (Taylor 2002; Wong et al. 2009) and quantity discounts (Klas-
torin et al. 2002; Li, Liu 2006).
Among all incentive systems, penalty costs and bonus payments are newer ones in the 
literature. Zimmer (2002) used penalty costs and bonus payments as incentive systems 
in his study. The penalty cost per item is paid by a supplier to a retailer when an or-
der is not completely delivered. In response, the retailer pays a bonus to the supplier 
when the order is delivered on time and in full amount. Zimmer (2002) found that the 
incentive system works as effectively as a central SC. Chiadamrong and Prasertwattana 
(2006) developed a system, which adds quantity discounts to penalty and bonus pay-
ments of Zimmer (2002). They showed that the model with all three incentives resulted 
in improving service level. 
Table 1. Studies showing who benefits from VMI
Study




No – Inventory levels increased Yes – Inventory levels decreased




Yes – Profits increased No – Holding costs increased
Yao et al. (2007) Yes – Holding cost decreased No – Holding cost increased
Yu et al. (2009) Yes – Inventory costs decreased  
in short term
No – Inventory costs increased  
in short-term
Chakraborty et al. 
(2015)
Yes – Costs may decrease  
with incentives
Yes – Costs may decrease  
with incentives
Yin and Ma (2015) showed in their studies that both parties obtained improved profits 
and service levels with the bonus contract based coordination. In a recent study, Lee 
et al. (2016) showed that VMI with stockout penalty cost performed as good as the 
integrated system where the supplier’s minimum cost under the contract is less than or 
equal to the total cost of the SC in the integrated system. The incentive system offering 
a penalty cost when there is a stockout is similar to our study, however, Lee et al. (2016) 
have not studied how to balance VMI benefits among the partners. 
Mateen et al. (2015) assumed a stock limit in retailers and penalty cost for the vendors 
for exceeding the limit in a stochastic demand environment. They explored the effects 
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of various levels of cost parameters on total costs with sensitivity analysis. However, 
they did not seek the effects of the coordination for retailers and the vendor separately. 
To the best of our knowledge, previous studies using penalty and bonus payments with 
VMI has not aimed to balance the benefits of the SC partners. Our study is different in 
the way that penalty and bonus payments are embedded in a VMI system and are used 
to balance benefits among SC members. Additionally, previous studies did not compare 
the performance of the VMI only and the VMI with incentives system. This study makes 
this comparison because observing the effects of using more than one coordination 
mechanism will be supportive in making better managerial decisions. 
2. Methodology
Discrete-event simulation is used to create the proposed distribution networks. The 
simulation software used is Arena 13.5 developed by Rockwell Software, Wisconsin, 
USA (Arena 2013). Simulation was chosen as the modeling tool because the proposed 
models include several stochastic variables such as demand, time between demands 
and lead times. This study investigates a two-echelon SC including ten identical buy-
ers and a supplier. Three different SC models are offered. The first and the base model 
is a traditional distribution network in which no coordination mechanism is used. A 
resemblance of the traditional system and the flow structure of the traditional system is 
shown in Figure 1 and 2 respectively. In the traditional system, there is no information 
flow between buyers and supplier other than the order placement. The second model is a 
VMI system in which the supplier decides when and how much to send to their buyers. 
To make such decisions, the supplier should have consumer demand information and the 
buyer’s inventory information. In VMI, the supplier also uses total consumer demand 
information to calculate their order amount. Despite the supplier makes decisions about 
the buyer’s inventory, the buyers carry their inventory costs. The supplier only carries 
the buyer’s order costs. A resemblance of a VMI system can be seen in Figure 3. 
Fig. 1. Flow diagram for the traditional system
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The third model used in this study is the VMI system with incentives, which focuses 
on lead times to improve the profits. Incentives have the following conditions: if the 
delivery time from a supplier to a buyer is below a predefined threshold with a full 
amount, the buyer pays a bonus to the supplier. If the delivery is below the exact order 
amount, undelivered items are backordered. The supplier pays a penalty cost for each 
backordered item. 
Incentive payments aim to increase the performance of the VMI. In all models, manu-
facturer replenishes supplier orders in full amount and fixed time. The traditional sys-
tem, VMI only and VMI with incentives are compared in terms of performance.
3. Mathematical modeling
Mathematical modeling in this study consists of two parts. In the first part, the estima-
tion of the performance indicators is explained in detail. The second part shows the 
calculation of inventory parameters used in the models. 
Fig. 2. Resemblance of the traditional system
Fig. 3. Resemblance of the VMI system
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3.1. Performance indicators
Performance indicators used for the comparisons are total SC profit, buyer’s total profit, 
and supplier’s profit. Since this study is focused on the benefits for SC members, profit 
is the main performance indicator in this study. The notations that will be used in per-
formance indicator calculations are as the following:
TCi = total cost,
ki = order cost per order,
hi = holding cost per item,
bi = backorder cost per item,
pi = purchase cost per item,
f = selling price of the product for the buyer,
ri = reorder point,
Invi = average inventory in the system,
Backi = average backorder quantity,
Puri = total amount of purchased products,
Ordi = total order amount (every order counts),
Sali = Total number of sold products,
Qj(t) = order quantity of jth buyer on time t,
Qs(t) = order quantity of supplier on time t,
Ii(t) = on hand inventory on time t,
OIi(t) = amount of inventory on order on time t,
PIi(t) = inventory position on time t (if this value drops to ri or below Qi(t) 
amount of order is given, PIi(t) = Ii(t) + OIi(t) – BMi(t)),
Di(t) = customer demand on time t,
BMi(t) = backorder amount on time t,
i = j, s (j = buyer, s = supplier),
j = 1,2, …, n,
t = 0,1,2, …, n.
Total costs for all the SC members are calculated as the sum of the holding cost, order 
cost, and backorder cost. Total costs are calculated for the SC and each chain mem-
ber separately. To calculate the average inventory amount and the average backorder 
amount, time persistent averages calculated by the simulation software are used. This 
way, all the inventory and backorder amounts on all t times are considered. For all chain 
members, total cost and total revenue calculations are shown in Equations 1–5:
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where: t = 0, 1, 2, …, n; i = j, s; j =1, 2, …, n.
The supplier uses (r, Q) inventory control system with a continuous review. When the 
inventory drops to r or below, Q amount is ordered. In the traditional SC, for the sup-
plier to calculate the parameters of this system, the buyers’ orders are considered. In 
the VMI system, the buyer will not place an order and buyers’ r and Q parameters are 
calculated by the supplier. That is why the r and Q parameters of the traditional system 
cannot be used in the VMI system. In the VMI system to calculate the right amount of 
order quantity (Q) and the reorder point (r) a systematic inventory control using total 
consumer demand information should be applied by the supplier.
3.2. Inventory parameters in the VMI system
In the VMI system, the supplier has the buyer’s customer demand and inventory infor-
mation. With this information, the supplier continuously reviews the buyer’s inventory. 
To decide when and how much of a product to send to the buyer, consumer demand 
and the buyer’s inventory amount are considered in an (r, Q) inventory model with sto-
chastic demand and stochastic lead time. According to this system, the supplier sends Q 
amount of products to the buyer when the buyer’s inventory level drops to r. 
It is assumed that products coming to the supplier from the manufacturer are in full 
amount. The supplier also uses the r, Q system with a stochastic demand as the order 
policy. To calculate the parameters of this system, consumer demand to the buyers is 
used as the demand information for the supplier. This is the most important difference 
between the traditional and the VMI system for the inventory control parameter calcu-
lation. In the traditional system, for the supplier, while r, Q is calculated, the buyer’s 
demand information is used. In the VMI system, for suppliers, while r, Q is calculated, 
the consumer demand information is used. In other words, in the VMI system, Ds for 
the supplier is the consumer demand. 
For both the buyer and the supplier, r, Q values that give the minimum total cost is cal-
culated. Calculated values are used in simulation models. Calculations are performed, 
as shown in Winston (2003), based on Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) model with 
stochastic demand. Assumptions of this model are as the following: 
1. Demand is backordered;
2. Continuous review is used;
3. Orders can be given at any time.
In calculations, as used in Winston (2003), it is assumed that PIj(t) = Ij(t) for initial 
values. During simulation runs, these values may be different from each other. For VMI, 
the total cost of the chain members will be as the following: 
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TCj (Qj,rj) = Expected holding cost + expected backorder cost,
TCs (Qs,rs) = Expected holding cost + expected backorder cost + expected order cost + 
expected buyers’ holding cost.
As used in Winston (2003), Qi value that minimizes total cost function is very close to 












For a certain Qi value, ri value which minimizes the TCi (Qi,ri) equation can be found 
by marginal analysis. Firstly, probability of stockout during lead time is calculated as 
shown in Equation 7 (Winston, 2003):
 
* ** *( *) 1
* ( ) * ( )
≥ = <
µ µ
i i i i
i i
i i i i
h Q h QP X r if
b D b D
. (7)
With the assumption that during lead time demand is normally distributed with a mean 
of µ(Xi) and a standard deviation of σ(Xi), non-stockout probability during lead time 
is calculated by subtracting the probability of stockout from 1. Then ri would be as 
calculated in Equation 8:
 
* * ( ) ( )= σ + µi i ir z X X . (8)
Total revenue and the total cost is calculated as shown in Equations 9 and 10:
 Total revenue (buyer) = TRj = f *Salj ; (9)
 Total revenue (supplier) = TRs = p j *Sals .  (10)
For the incentive system, the bonus is added to the total cost of the buyers and the 
penalty is added to the total cost of the suppliers. Bonus, penalty, cost, and revenue are 
calculated as demonstrated in Equations 11 and 12 for the incentive system:
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Penalty t
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.  (12)
In the incentive systems, total cost for buyers and suppliers, and total revenue for buyers 
and suppliers were calculated as in Equations 13, 14, 15 and 16 respectively: 
 0
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=
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TR f Sal Penalty t ; (15)
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TR p Sal Bonus t . (16)
Finally, total profit is calculated by subtracting total cost from total revenue as displayed 
in Equations 17 and 18:
 Profitj = TRj – TCj  ; (17)
 Profits = TRs – TCs  . (18)
4. Numerical example 
To apply the proposed models, inventory and order data of a heating equipment retailer 
firm in Manisa, Turkey is used. Several data were obtained from the retailer which are 
as follows: consumer demand amounts for 18 months, time between consumer demands 
for 18 months, demand from buyer to the supplier during 18 months, lead time, reorder 
point, buying and selling price of the product. The 18 month data of consumer demand, 
time between consumer demands and demand from buyer to the supplier were observed 
from June 2012 to December 2014. Based on the data obtained, stochastic variables 
of the consumer demands, the time between consumer demands and lead time were 
calculated as 5+ gamm (0.667, 4.36) units per arrival, 0.5 + weib (3.98, 0.991) days 
time between arrivals and norm (12, 3.38) days respectively. Any variance in the data 
is expected to be represented in the calculated stochastic variables. The manager of the 
retailer firm reported that there are several similar buyers of the same supplier around 
the close territory. For this reason, it is assumed that there are ten identical buyers. For 
all the buyers, consumer demand, time between consumer demands, and demand from 
buyer to supplier is assumed to be the same. Cost values, lead time parameters, and 
consumer demand variables as obtained from the retailer can be seen in Table 2. 
Table 2. Cost and lead time parameters used in the models
Variable Value
Buyer holding cost (hj) 20% of pj (Waters 2003) = 21/year, 1.75/month 
Buyer backorder cost (bj) Profit loss per unit: 30/year, 2.5/month 
Buyer order cost (kj) 50/order
Buyer purchase cost (pj) 105/unit
Supplier holding cost (hs) 20% of ps =16.4/year, 1.36/month 
Supplier backorder cost (bs) Profit loss per unit = 23/year, 1.916/month 
Supplier order cost (ks) 50/order
Supplier purchase cost (ps) 82/unit (profit margin 28.5%)
Lead time between supplier and buyer Norm (12, 3.38) days
Lead time to supplier 6 days
Time between consumer arrivals 0.5 + weib (3.98, 0.991) days
Consumer demand 5 + gamm (0.667, 4.36) units per arrival
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Since obtained data is for 18 months, for EOQ calculations the planning period is used 
as a month. Also, for lead time the demand planning period is considered as a month. 
r, Q parameters for the VMI simulation are calculated based on the equations in Sec-
tion 3. r, Q parameters for the traditional system are used as obtained from the buyer. 
For the Traditional (TRD), VMI and VMI incentive (VMIINV) systems, three simula-
tion models are established. Warm up period is identified by detecting the time when 
the profit values for the traditional model start to become steady. After the 24th month, 
profit in the traditional system become steady. Table 3 shows the simulation parameters 
used in the models. 
Table 3. Simulation parameters
Parameters Values
Total running time 7920 
Warmup period 720 
Total time to obtain data 7200
Replication number 60 
Time unit day
Incentive mechanisms are based on three parameters; bonus, penalty for backorders 
and lead time threshold. Lead time threshold is the value used to decide whether to pay 
a bonus to the supplier. If the supplier brings products below the threshold time, then 
the buyer pays a bonus to the supplier. To find the most appropriate values of these 
variables, simulated scenario analyses are performed. For the scenario analysis, all the 
combinations of the three variables between a certain range are used. For bonus and 
the penalty cost, the range is identified as 1 to 20 per product. For the threshold, the 
range is used as 6 to 11 days. The aim of the simulation experiments is to find the best 
parameter combination in which the supplier and the buyers gain higher profits than the 
traditional system in a more balanced way compared to the other available combina-
tions. The selected combination is used in the simulation runs. 
A scenario analysis is performed for the VMIINV model since it is the only model that 
includes incentive parameters. Process analyzer from Rockwell Arena Software from 
Wisconsin, USA is used for the scenario analysis. Since there are too many combina-
tions of the incentive variables in the defined ranges, only results from the selected 
combinations are given here. Profit for the buyers, the supplier, the system and profit 
differences compared to the traditional system for selected parameter combinations can 
be seen in Table 4. 
In Table 4, the integer combination of 19, 2, 11 for bonus, penalty and threshold, respec-
tively provide the most balanced profit distribution among the buyers and the supplier. 
In this combination, the profit increase for the buyers is close to the profit increase for 
the supplier but the buyers’ total profit increase is still more than the supplier’s increase. 
To reduce this difference, the scenario analysis continues with decimal increases to 
penalty cost. Among the tested combinations, 19, 2.126, 11 is chosen to be the one 
that provides the most balanced profit distribution between the buyers and the supplier. 
Therefore, 19, 2.126, 11 values for bonus, penalty and threshold, respectively, is chosen 
to be used in simulation runs as incentive parameters for VMIINV model.
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Table 4. Chosen values in scenario analysis for VMIINV















vmiinv 19 4 11 9623.8 11405.4 21029.1 923.27 –326.59 1249.86
vmiinv 19 2 11 9020.1 12009 21029.1 319.57 277.01 42.56
vmiinv 20 2 10 9370.1 11659 21029.1 669.57 –72.99 742.56
vmiinv 18 1 9 9506.4 11522.7 21029.1 805.87 –209.29 1015.16
vmiinv 19 2.1 11 9050.3 11978.8 21029.1 348.4 364.0 –15.59
vmiinv 19 2.11 11 9053.3 11975.8 21029.1 351.4 361.0 –9.56
vmiinv 19 2.12 11 9056.3 11972.8 21029.1 354.4 357.9 –3.52
vmiinv 19 2.125 11 9057.9 11971.3 21029.1 355.9 356.4 –0.50
vmiinv 19 2.126 11 9058.2 11971.0 21029.1 356.2 356.1 0.10
vmiinv 19 2.127 11 9058.5 11970.7 21029.1 356.5 355.8 0.71
5. Results
In this study, paired comparisons in profits based on simulation outputs is used to com-
pare the models. Paired comparisons are commonly used to compare simulation output 
measures in the literature (Kamalapurkar 2011; Southard 2001; Southard, Swenseth 
2008). Before the comparison results, mean and standard deviation of the performance 
measures of the proposed models is presented in Table 5. 
In this study for α0 = 0.05, confidence interval of 95% is used. Since more than two 
systems are compared, confidence interval numbers are calculated as c = c = k (k–1)/2. 
Then comparisons for alpha is α = α0/c (Kamalapurkar 2011; Rossetti 2010). In this 
study, there are three models – TRD, VMI, VMIINV – for paired comparisons. The 
number of paired comparisons is found c = 3*(3–1)/2 = 3, and alpha (α) for paired 
comparisons is calculated as α = 0.05/3 = 0.0482.
The first performance indicator is total system profit. Paired comparison results for total 
profit is given in Table 6. Our results show that both the VMIINV and the VMI systems 
produce more profit than the traditional system. The VMIINV and VMI systems are 
found to have no difference in system profit. Systematic inventory control with VMI, an 
Table 5. Profit values of simulation models
  ProfitRet* ProfitSup** Profit Sys***
Model N Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev.
TRD 60 8700.5 267.4 43687.7 1086.7 20432.5 534.6
VMIINV 60 9058.2 267.1 44954.1 1084.9 21029.1 580.7
VMI 60 9880.2 288.3 44309.0 1071.2 21032.5 579.2
Notes: *ProfitRet is used for profit for the retailers; **ProfitSup is used for profit for the supplier; 
***ProfitSys is used for the profit for the system.
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appropriate amount of product delivery on time, and supplier’s inventory control based 
on consumer demand induce an increase in total SC profit.
The second performance indicator is buyers’ total profit. Paired comparison results for 
retailers’ profit can be seen in Table 7. Results show that the VMIINV and VMI mod-
els provide more profit for buyers than the traditional model (p < 0.0482). Due to the 
inventory control handled by the supplier in VMI, buyers have balanced order amounts. 
Because of the balanced order amounts and order costs carried by the supplier using 
VMI systems have brought more profit for buyers. 
Another result of our analysis is that the VMIINV result in less profit for buyers than 
the VMI model. The reason for this finding is that in the VMIINV model, the buyers 
compensate bonus payments to the supplier that increases their costs. Besides that, 
buyers still have more profit in the VMIINV compared to the traditional model. With 
incentives, the profit of buyers decreased but the amount of the profit is still more than 
the traditional system. This condition is an indication of buyers sharing some of their 
benefits from the VMI with the supplier to form a balanced distribution.
The last analysis is about how VMI and incentives affected the supplier’s performance. 
As shown in Table 8, the VMIINV model significantly increased the supplier’s profit 
when compared to the traditional model (p < 0.0482). VMI only model decreased the 
profit of the supplier. To increase the whole SC performance, one of the chain mem-
bers may have to sacrifice their benefit (Ryu 2006). In our study, in the VMI only case, 
the member that sacrifices its profit is the supplier. Supplier’s profit merely increased in 
the case when the incentive system is used with the VMI. Buyers also have more profit 
with VMIINV as compared to the traditional system. These results indicate that to make 
the supplier gain profit from the VMI, financial incentives should be used. 
Table 6. Paired comparisons for total system profit
Up Down t sd p
VMIINV – TRD 469.3 955.4 9.583 59 0.0000
VMI – TRD 513.5 917.8 11.575 59 0.0000
VMIINV – VMI –212.1 205.5 –0.052 59 0.9587
Table 7. Paired comparisons for total retailers’ profit
Up Down t sd p
VMIINV – TRD 235.93 476.53 9.682 59 0.000
VMI – TRD 1066.63 1289.89 34.510 59 0.000
VMIINV – VMI –929.70 –714.36 –24.963 59 0.000
Table 8. Paired comparisons for the profit of the supplier
Up Down t sd p
VMIINV – TRD 223.5 488.7 8.783 59 0.0000
VMI – TRD –578.0 –347.2 –13.107 59 0.0000
VMIINV – VMI 729.2 908.3 29.890 59 0.0000
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The current study explored how members of the SC benefited from VMI usage. Both 
the VMI and the VMIINV systems increase buyers’ profits comparing to the traditional 
system. This increase is more in the VMI system than in the VMIINV system. From the 
supplier’s perspective, only VMIINV increased the supplier’s profit while VMI with-
out incentives decreased the supplier’s profit when it was compared to the traditional 
system. These findings support studies that show VMI provides benefits for buyers, 
but cause a loss for suppliers (Dong, Xu 2002; Mishra, Raghunathan 2004; Yao et al. 
2007; Yu et al. 2009). Reduced benefits for suppliers with VMI indicate that carrying 
the buyers’ order costs and managing their inventory increased the costs and reduced 
the supplier’s profit. The supplier’s rearrangement of their inventory parameters based 
on consumer demands did not compensate for the profit loss. For the supplier, merely 
VMI usage does not seem advantageous. To overcome the loss suffered from VMI, 
financial incentives are needed. 
Conclusions
This study demonstrates that the incentive utilization in VMI distributes profits in a 
balanced way between buyers and the supplier. In the VMI only system, most of the 
profits of the entire SC is accumulated in the buyers. With incentives, the profit of the 
buyers is less than the VMI system without incentives but is still higher than the tra-
ditional system. These findings indicate, with incentives the benefit gained in the total 
system is shared between buyers and the supplier. The balanced distribution is based on 
appropriate incentive parameters. To choose the proper parameters for the incentives, a 
scenario analysis is used. The scenario analysis reveals incentive parameters that pro-
vide balanced profit distribution between buyers and the supplier. Among the proposed 
models, the VMIINV is chosen as the best model since it increases total system profit, 
the buyers’ profit and the supplier’s profit comparison to the raditional system. 
While offering a VMI system with incentives, this study provides several contributions 
to the literature. Firstly, as the performance indicator, this study did not only choose 
total system performance. The buyers’ and the supplier’s performance enhancement is 
also considered while choosing the best model. The second contribution is that the sup-
plier could also gain benefit from VMI by embedding an incentive system. In this study, 
it was observed that to participate in VMI and to increase system performance the sup-
pliers lose some portion of their profit. Using incentives with VMI eliminated this loss. 
The third contribution is from a managerial aspect. A supplier firm can be unwilling to 
participate in a VMI system considering that it will carry the buyer’s costs. If managers 
try to convince suppliers by stating that they will also increase their profits by sharing 
the loss and the profits with some incentives, suppliers may feel more secure partici-
pating in the VMI system. This study has proposed a way that firms are encouraged to 
coordinate and share information with each other. Another contribution of this study 
is to propose simulation models and the inventory parameter calculation methodology 
which can be used for further studies. The conceptual model can also be used to develop 
new SC models. 
This study has some limitations and however offers possible future research topics. For 
further studies, longer ranges for incentive parameter may be used to improve flexibility 
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and accuracy. In a longer range, parameters can be searched by using different methods. 
This study may have some implementations on bullwhip effect in the SCs. Bullwhip 
effect occurs due to increased demand variations in the upper streams of the SCs. In 
this study, supplier demands in the two VMI systems are calculated based on consumer 
demands instead of buyer demands meaning one echelon is eliminated. This probably 
result in less variation in supplier demands. However, this is only an intuition and 
should be measured quantitatively in future studies. 
Another limitation of this study is that it is assumed that the buyers are identical to each 
other. A system that includes diverse buyers can reveal various insights about VMI and 
incentive systems. The proposed systems can also be explored for more complex SCs, 
including three or more echelons. A final limitation of this study is due to the simulation 
methodology. Modeling stochastic variables with simulation consists random elements, 
and values of these random elements change in every simulation run. Randomness may 
result in some uncontrollable variation and error in the results. Although this certain 
situation is tried to be eliminated by excluding warm-up period from the analysis, the 
simulation may still have some undesired variation. 
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